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Pension scheme deficits continue to be a cause of concern in the United Kingdom.  There are several 
ways of measuring the shortfall of assets relative to liabilities, but an increasingly relevant measure 
is the cost of buyout.  On this measure, there were sufficient assets to cover only 62% of buyout 
liabilities in 2015, and in the previous ten years this figure has never risen above 68% (Pension 
Protection Fund, 2015).  However, deficits are largely a historical issue  W in other words, they relate 
to liabilities that have already been accrued. 
At least as important are the costs for an employer that ongoing pension accrual continues to 
generate  W and how that cost has changed over time.  In addition, it is important to recognise not 
only how much these costs have risen, but also what has driven these costs.  I therefore analyse the 
change in pension costs to identify the extent to which key drivers  W discount rates, longevity, and 
the benefits payable  W have affected the change in cost.  I also show the change in these costs in the 
context of other employment-related expenses, particularly National Insurance Contributions (NICs). 
The answer to these questions is important, as it shows the impact that defined benefit accrual has 
on the cost of employment.  In particular, it shows how the cost of employment has changed for an 
employer funding a defined benefit pension scheme compared with one providing a defined 
contribution arrangement.  This is important because it demonstrates the extent to which defined 
benefit pensions are an additional burden to the employers that still provide them. 
It is also important to recognise the relevance of defined benefit pension funding from another 
perspective  W that is, how it affects the value of earnings that individuals receive.  In other words, it 
is important to recognise how much the earnings of individuals have changed once the value of 
pension accrual is taken into account.  This is important because the value of defined benefit 
pension accrual provides an indication of cost of an adequate retirement income  W something that is 
relevant for individuals in defined contribution schemes. 
Danzer and Dolton (2012) consider the value of pension accrual when they propose a measure of 
total reward which includes not just pay, but pensions and other benefits in kind.  They go on to 
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞŝƚĂƐƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵŵŽĨĂůůƚŚĞƐĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐŽǀĞƌĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ ? 
This issue of pension accrual in this context is also addressed in Sweeting (2008), which looks at the 
change in the cost and value of accrual from 1995 to 2005.  This paper extends that work to 2015 
and beyond, as well as improving the methodology. 
Other authors have looked at the value of defined benefit accrual in the context of public and 
private sector pensions.  All public sector schemes are defined benefit1, whilst private sector defined 
benefit provision is continuing to decline in importance.  Indeed, from 2004 to 2015, the number of 
active members of private sector defined benefit schemes fell from 3.6 million to 1.6 million.  
Furthermore, of the 1.6 million active members in private sector defined benefit schemes, only 0.6 
million were in schemes or sections of schemes that were open to new members.  However, for 
public sector defined benefit schemes, the number of active members rose from 5.0 million to 5.6 
million over the same period (Office for National Statistics 2015, 2016). 
A common approach in this type of analysis is to look at the average level of pension provision in the 
public and private sector.  Using this approach, Disney et al (2009) find that the impact of defined 
                                                          
1 A partial exception is the Universities Superannuation Scheme, which has introduced a defined contribution 
section in addition to the main defined benefit scheme, whose benefits are now capped. 
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benefit pensions for public sector employees is to make employment more valuable than for private 
sector employees even if the latter are members of defined benefit pension plans.  This analysis 
controls for age, sex and education.  The clear limitation of this analysis is that not all private sector 
workers are accruing defined benefit pensions. 
Cribb and Emmerson (2016a) go further than Disney et al (2009), controlling not just for age, sex, 
and education, but also for experience and region.  They carry out an examination of the impact of 
pensions on the pay of public and private sector workers, allowing for type of pension provision for 
those in the private sector, thus overcoming the main limitation in the work of Disney et al.  Cribb 
and Emmerson value defined benefit pension accrual using the current unit method, which gives the 
change in discounted present value of the pension income from one year to the next, net of 
employee contributions.  For defined contribution pensions, Cribb and Emmerson look not only at 
the level of contributions, but also at the returns received.  This is used to give a view of the value of 
pension accrual in 2012 under a range of different scenarios.  They then go on to look at the average 
pay differential between public and private sector workers over time, allowing for the average level 
and type of pension provision in each group.  This analysis shows that public sector pay is 
significantly higher than private sector pay, even before allowing for pensions  W and that pensions 
only increases this differential. 
Whilst this analysis is useful from an aggregate standpoint, it does not explicitly address the question 
of the impact over time on an individual who is a member of a defined benefit rather than a defined 
contribution scheme.  This is important because the decline in private sector defined benefit 
provision has been matched by the growth in private sector defined contribution provision.  It is 
worth considering developments in defined contribution pensions further, as it is the contribution 
rates here against which the cost of defined benefit accrual should be compared. 
The Office for National Statistics (2015, 2016) reports that over the period 2004 to 2015, active 
membership of occupational defined contribution schemes  W that is, those defined contribution 
schemes set up by an employer under trust law  W rose from 1.0 million to 3.9 million, although the 
bulk of this rise came as a result of the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), which received a 
large number of members following the introduction of auto-enrolment2.  This is emphasised by the 
fact that active membership of defined contribution schemes grew from 1.2 million to 3.2 million 
between 2013 and 2014, the period during which auto-enrolment came into effect. 
The process of auto-enrolment is being rolled out until February 20183, so the growth of active 
membership in defined contribution plans can be expected to continue.  Auto-enrolment is 
important because it includes a specification of the minimum level of contributions that must be 
paid.  However, the minimum level of contributions allowed for by auto-enrolment is not large.  
Until April 2018, the minimum contribution is 2% of qualifying earnings  W that is, earnings between 
the Lower Earnings Limit and the Upper Earnings Limit  W of which the employer must pay at least 1% 
of qualifying earnings; the total contribution is expected to rise to 5%, with a minimum employer 
contribution of 2%, in April 2018; and from April 2019, it is proposed that the minimum will rise 
again to 8% of salaries and an employer minimum of 3% of salaries4.  The 2018 levels are 
comparable with current levels of contribution to defined contribution schemes: the Office for 
                                                          
2 The number of defined contribution members does not appear to have been added to through personal 
pension membership: according to HMRC (2015), the number of employees contributing to personal pension 
schemes  W or having contributions made on their behalf  W has stayed constant at 6.0 million. 




National Statistics (2016) estimates that in 2015, members of open defined contribution schemes 
contributed 1.5% of salaries, with employers contributing 2.5% of salaries.  Because these 
percentages relate to salaries rather than qualifying earnings, a direct comparison with auto-
enrolment figures is not possible.  The 2015 figures are lower even than those from 2014, where 
employees contributed 1.7% of salaries and employers contributed 2.9% of salaries (Office for 
National Statistics, 2015).  These low rates are coincident with the introduction of auto-enrolment  W 
in 2013, employees contributed 2.5% of salaries, with employers paying 6.0%.  This might suggest 
that contribution rates for the newly auto-enrolled are at or close to legal minima.  However, Cribb 
and Emmerson (2016b) find that there is a large increase in contributions at the minimum levels, but 
also a substantial increase in the proportion of people with contributions well above the minimum. 
One would therefore expect that auto-enrolment  W particularly when higher contribution rates 
arrive  W should result in larger pots for members of defined contribution schemes.  But this does not 
necessarily mean that the level of benefits will be adequate.  As mentioned above, the cost of 
defined benefit pension provision is a sensible benchmark against which defined contribution 
schemes can be measured.  One comparison is of the contributions actually paid.  the Office for 
National Statistics (2016) estimates that in 2015, members of open defined benefit schemes 
contributed 5% of salaries, with employers contributing 16.2% of salaries.  However, these 
contribution rates reflect not just the cost of ongoing benefits, but also the deficit reduction 
contributions paid in respect of previously accrued benefits.  Instead, it makes sense to calculate the 
cost of future benefits for a defined benefit pension scheme explicitly, as I do in this paper, and to 
compare it to the levels of contributions being made to defined contribution schemes. 
2. Organisation of this paper 
First, I outline way in which I calculate the cost of pension accrual, in section 3.  In this section, I 
describe both the methodology I use, and the assumptions that I make.  In section 4, I calculate the 
change in earnings, and the appropriate allowance for NICs and for income tax.  In Section 5 I 
present my results.  First, I give the total cost of accrual, before analysing the factors driving the 
year-to-year changes.  I then look at the impact of defined benefit pension accrual on the cost of 
employment for a company, and then on the value of earnings to an employee. 
3. Calculating the cost of pension accrual 
3.1. Overview 
The cost of pension accrual is calculated as a proportion of salary.  In this paper, I assume that the 
benefit accrued is one-sixtieth of earnings, with a retirement age of 65.  I also assume that the 
nature of the benefit is final salary: in other words, the pension accrued in any year is revalued to 
retirement in line with the expected growth in earnings.  However, for reasons discussed later, I also 
consider the change in the cost of accrual for members of career average revalued earnings (CARE) 
schemes, where pensions are increased prior to retirement in line with price inflation, subject to a 
maximum of 5% per annum over the period.  The pension is then paid for the lifetime of the 
individual, with increases being paid in line with statutory minima.  For simplicity, it is assumed that 
the individual accruing benefits is a man, that no spouse benefits are accrued, and that there is no 
guarantee period.  The analysis is carried out on an annual basis, and the period covered in the main 
analysis is the 12-month period starting 31 March 1995 to the twelve-month period starting 31 
March 2015.  These dates are chosen to coincide with the changes in tax years that start a few days 
later on 6 April and, thus, tax rates and bands.  The discount and inflation rates as at the previous 
month end are used. 
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The cost of accrual as at 31 March 2015 can be used to calculate the impact of pensions for the 
twelve-month period to 31 March 2016.  However, it is interesting to consider the impact of interest 
rate changes in the light of the Brexit referendum, and also the potential move from statutory to 
conditional increases to pensions in payment. 
On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.  In order to offset the 
impact of this decision on the UK economy, the Bank of England cut base rates to 0.25% and 
embarked on a policy of Quantitative Easing (QE).  Research on the last program of QE that ran from 
2009 to 2012 indicates that long-term bond yields has been lowered by anything from 30 to 125 
basis points (Meier, 2009; Joyce et al., 2011; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Breedon et al., 2012; 
Bridges and Thomas, 2012; and Kapetanios et al., 2012).  More specific research on the term 
structure of changes, as well as the impact on real interest rates, shows that pension scheme 
ůŝĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇŝŶĨůĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĂŶŬŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐ ?^ǁĞĞƚŝŶŐĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Given that long-term interest rates as at 30 September 2016 were significantly lower than they were 
as at 31 March 2016, it seems that the round of quantitative easing (Bank of England, 2016) is having 
a similar impact.  As such, I also look at the cost of accrual calculated on the 31 March 2015 basis, 
but using bond yields and expected inflation as at 31 March 2016 and 30 September 2016. 
In a more recent development, it has been suggested that the guaranteed pensions in payment, 
whether at 5% LPI or 2.5% LPI, could be replaced with conditional indexation (Cumbo, 2016).  This is 
a mechanism by which increases to pensions are paid only if there are sufficient funds; otherwise, 
pensions remain flat.  It is straightforward to evaluate the impact of such a change on the cost of 
future accrual, so I look at how this would affect the estimated cost of accrual at 30 September 
2016. 
The cost of pension benefits is calculated by projecting into the future the payments arising from the 
year of pension accrual, and then discounting these payments back to give a present value.  More 
precisely, the value at time  ? of a payment made at time ݐ (where ݐ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ? ǥ and is measured in 
years) to a member of a final salary scheme currently aged ݔ whose retirement age is 65 is ܿ௫ǡ௧, 
which is equal to: 
ܿ௫ǡ௧ ൌ ൞  ? ? ?ൈ ݈௫ା௧ǡ௧݈௫ǡ଴ ൈ ݁଺ହି௫݁଴ ൈ ݅௧௖݅଺ହି௫௖ ൈ ෑ  ? ? ൅ ௝݀௧௝ୀଵ ݂݅ݐ ൒  ? ?െ ݔ ? ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  
(1) 
where ݈௫ା௧ǡ௧ is the projected population for age ݔ ൅ ݐ and time ݐ, so ݈௫ା௧ǡ௧Ȁ݈௫ǡ଴ is the probability of 
an individual aged ݔ surviving to time ݐ; ݁௧ is the earnings index at time ݐ used to revalue benefits 
before retirement; ݅௧௖ is the capped price index used to increase benefits after retirement at time ݐ  W 
that is, the rate of change in the index is limited to some capped amount; and ݀௧ is the spot discount 
rate for a term of ݐ.  The various price indices used are discussed in section 3.3; the discount rate is 
discussed in section 3.4; and earnings are discussed in section 3.5.  A similar formula is used for 
members of CARE schemes: 




where all terms are as per Equation (1), with the additional term ݅௧ being the price index at time ݐ 
used to revalue benefits before retirement.  The total cost of accrual for age ݔ, per £1 of gross 
earnings, ܥ௫ is obtained by summing the values of these individual cash flows: ܥ௫ ൌ ෍ ܿ௫ǡ௞ଵଶ଴ି௫௞ୀଵ  
(3) 
The upper limit in this summation reflects the assumption that no individuals will live beyond 120.  
This is built into the longevity model used, which I describe in section 3.2.  I further define the cost of 
accrual for an individual aged ݔ evaluated at time ݐ as ܥ௫ǡ௧.  This can be used to derive the change in 
the cost of accrual over time, as: ȟܥ௫ǡ௧ ൌ ܥ௫ǡ௧ܥ௫ǡ௧ିଵ 
(4) 
A similar formula can be used to calculate the impact on the cost of accrual of longevity, benefit 
changes and interest rates.  Let ܥ௫ǡ௧௟  be the cost of accrual for an individual aged ݔ evaluated at time ݐ, but using the longevity data from ݐ െ  ?.  The element of the change relating to longevity, ȟܥ௫ǡ௧௟ , is 
therefore: ȟܥ௫ǡ௧௟ ൌ ܥ௫ǡ௧ െ ܥ௫ǡ௧௟ܥ௫ǡ௧ିଵ  
(5) 
Equivalent expressions can be derived for the impact of benefit changes and interest rates. 
3.2. The longevity model 
Improving life expectancy clearly has an impact on the cost of future pension accrual.  There are two 
components of longevity that are of interest here.  The first is the expected change in longevity.  
When moving from time ݐ to time ݐ ൅  ?, one would expect the cost of accrual to increase because of 
anticipated improvements in life expectancy.  However, if the change in longevity is different from 
than anticipated, then this will clearly have an additional impact on the cost of pension accrual. 
In modelling life expectancy, I assume that at any time ݐ, information on mortality rates will be 
available only up to time ݐ െ  ?.  The mortality data used is central rate of mortality for England and 
Wales males aged 20 to 100, from the Human Mortality Database (2016).  The natural logarithm of 
mortality rates is extrapolated linearly from age 101 to 120, based on data from ages 81 to 100.  I 
then take data from ݐ െ  ? ? to ݐ െ  ? and ages 20 to 120, and apply singular value decomposition to 
the data, as described by Lee and Carter (1992).  I then fit a linear function to the time component, 
and project this forward.  Applying this to the age components gives projected central mortality 
rates for times ݐ െ  ? onward.  Each central mortality rate ݉௫ǡ௧ is converted to an initial mortality 




for ages 21 to 100, the following approximation is used: ݍ௫ǡ௧ ൌ ݉௫ǡ௧ ቈ  ? ൅ሺ ?  ? ? ሻ݉ ௫ିଵǡ௧ ? ൅ሺ ?  ? ? ? ሻ൫݉௫ǡ௧ െ ݉௫ିଵǡ௧൯ െ ሺ ?  ? ? ሻ݉ ௫ǡ௧݉௫ିଵǡ௧቉ 
(7) 
and for ages over 100, the following approximation is used: ݍ௫ǡ௧ ൌ ݉௫ǡ௧ ? ൅ ௫݉ǡ௧ 
(8) 
Each year, a new year of mortality information is assumed to become available, so the projected 
mortality is recalculated. This approach differs from that used in Sweeting (2008), where I estimated 
changes dues to mortality costs using mortality tables published by the CMI Bureau.  Because 
updates to these tables are produced infrequently, the impact of longevity improvements can 
appear uneven.  Furthermore, because they are produced only some years after the period of 
analysis, the impact of longevity improvements is not recognised until a significant period after it as 
been felt by the scheme. 
As well as allowing the cost of the defined benefit accrual to be calculated, I am also able to isolate 
the impact on the cost of changes in longevity. 
3.3. Benefit changes 
A key part of the analysis is the impact on the cost of pension accrual of the benefit changes that 
have occurred due to legislation.  The first of these was the requirement to provide increases to 
pensions in payment in line with the Retail Prices Index (RPI), subject to a maximum of 5% per 
annum, from 5 April 1997.  This is known as 5% Limited Price Indexation, or 5% LPI.  Prior to 5 April 
1997, no increases to pensions in payment were required unless a scheme was contracted out from 
the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme.  From April 2005, this minimum requirement was 
reduced, with the cap being cut to 2.5% per annum, giving 2.5% LPI.  In terms of ݅௧௖, this means that 
if, for example, the index is being considered at a time when 2.5% LPI is in force, the annual change 
in ݅௧௖ cannot exceed 2.5% even if the change in RPI is greater than 2.5%. 
From 5 April 2011 the rate of inflation used in the calculation of benefits was changed from the 
Retail Prices Index to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI).  This applies to both the rate underlying the 
5% LPI increases to pensions in payment, and also to the increases to pensions in the period before 
retirement for members of CARE schemes.  As stated in the section 3.1, the pension accrued in any 
year is revalued to retirement in line with price inflation, subject to a maximum of 5% per annum 
over the period.  Before 5 April 2011, this measure of inflation was RPI; after this date it was CPI. 
As with the longevity cost, the change in the minimum benefits allows me not only to calculate the 
change in the cost of benefit accrual, but also to isolate the impact on benefit accrual of the change 
in the minimum benefits payable. 
In practice, an individual may have experienced benefit changes over the last two decades other 
than those dictated by legislation.  Key amongst these is the change to a CARE basis from a final 
salary arrangement.  Whilst the former allows for pensions to increase up to retirement in line with 
prices, the latter allows for an increase in line with salaries.  The impact of this change depends on 
the difference between future salary and price inflation, and the age at which any change occurs, 
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but an idea of the impact can be gauged by considering the change in the cost of final salary and 
CARE accrual over the period.  Another potential change is a change to the retirement age, which 
again could take many forms.  As such, I look at the order of magnitude that such changes might 
bring but they do not form part of the central analysis. 
3.4. Interest rate changes 
Cribb and Emmerson (2016a) make a key simplification in their model of pension costs, in that they 
assume a real discount rate of 3% per annum.  This simplification is appropriate for single-period 
cross-sectional analysis.  However, as I show in this paper, the change in discount rate has been an 
important factor in the changing value of defined benefit pensions. 
The discount rate has more than one component.  First, there are the inflation rates used to project 
benefits.  Even if the benefit structure is not changing, the assumed rate of inflation by whatever 
measure is appropriate will develop over time.  For RPI, the assumed rate of inflation is taken from 
ƚŚĞĂŶŬŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛimplied inflation spot ĐƵƌǀĞ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂŶŬŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
nominal and real government bond spot curves. 
All index-linked UK government bonds pay coupons based on RPI.  As such, information on the CPI 
spot curve is harder to find.  I therefore approximate it by deducting the average difference between 
historical RPI and CPI for the ten years before the calculation date from the implied RPI inflation spot 
curve. 
The projected cash flows are discounted using the spot rate on the UK nominal government bond 
yield curve at the appropriate term, as calculated by the Bank of England, plus a risk premium.  The 
risk premium is 1% per annum, which is consistent with the difference between the median single 
effective discount rate (SEDR) and the Bank of England 20-year nominal spot rate observed by the 
Pensions Regulator (2016) from 2005 to 2014. 
3.5. Projected earnings changes 
A key assumption used to assess the cost of a defined benefit pension is the rate at which earnings 
increase before retirement.  For this assumption, I add the average difference between historical 
earnings and historical RPI for the ten years before the calculation date to the implied RPI inflation 
spot curve.  This calculation itself yields some interesting results.  As Figure 1 shows, historical real 
earnings increases have fallen significantly over the last twenty years, to the extent that real 
earnings growth relative to RPI is negative, and relative to CPI is around zero.  This means that for 
calculations made as at 2014 or later, the estimate of future salary inflation is around the same as 
the estimate for future CPI inflation.  This could also be used to estimate the impact over time of 




Figure 1  ? Historical real earnings growth 
 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ ?KĨĨŝĐĞĨŽƌEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ calculations 
4. Calculating the change in earnings 
Before looking at the impact of pensions accrual on earnings, I first look at how earnings have 
themselves changed  W ďŽƚŚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?/ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞ 
x gross earnings excluding pensions; 
x gross earnings plus employer National Insurance Contributions (NICs); and 
x gross earnings plus employer National Insurance Contributions (NICs) plus defined benefit 
pension accrual. 
&ƌŽŵƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?/ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞ 
x gross earnings excluding pensions; 
x gross earnings less employee National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and income tax; and 
x gross earnings less employee National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and income tax plus 
defined benefit pension accrual. 
Initially, I define gross earnings as UK Private Sector Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000, 
and the UK Private Sector Average Earnings Index before this, both on a seasonally adjusted basis 
and including bonuses.  As these series overlap, I am able to construct a continuous series of annual 
earnings for the full period of analysis.  Annual figures for each twelve-month period running from 
April to the following March are calculated by converting the weekly earnings figure for each month 
to a monthly figure, and then aggregating over the twelve months.  The gross earnings series for the 


























































































































































































































































Real Earnings Growth (vs RPI)
Real Earnings Growth (vs CPI)
Real Earnings Growth - 10 year moving average (vs RPI)
Real Earnings Growth - 10 year moving average (vs CPI)
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ȟܩ௧ ൌ ܩ௧ܩ௧ିଵ െ  ? 
(9) 
To determine the change in the total cost to the employer before pensions, which I denote ȟ ௧ܰ௘௥, 
employer national insurance contributions, ܰܫܥ௧௘௥ , must be added to the numerator and 
denominator of (8):  ȟ ௧ܰ௘௥ ൌ ܩ௧ ൅ ܰܫܥ௧௘௥ܩ௧ିଵ ൅ ܰܫܥ௧ିଵ௘௥ െ  ? 
(10) 
dŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŶĞƚĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨƉĞŶƐŝŽŶĂĐĐƌƵĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ
for an individual aged ݔ for the year to time ݐ is ȟ ௫ܶǡ௧௘௥, defined as:  ȟ ௫ܶǡ௧௘௥ ൌ ܩ௧ ൅ ܰܫܥ௧௘௥ ൅ ൫ܩ௧ൈܥ௫ǡ௧൯ܩ௧ିଵ ൅ ܰܫܥ௧ିଵ௘௥ ൅ ൫ܩ௧ିଵൈܥ௫ǡ௧ିଵ൯ െ  ? 
(11) 
where ܥ௫ǡ௧ is the cost of accruing an extra yeĂƌ ?ƐƉĞŶƐŝŽŶƉĞƌ ? ?ŽĨŐƌŽƐƐĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐĨŽƌŝŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
aged ݔ at time ݐ.  Note that this is the only earnings measure where age is relevant  W in other words, 
I do not allow for any change in gross earnings by age. 
&ƌŽŵĂŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞĐalculation is similar, except that NICs are a deduction rather 
than an addition, and that they are deducted along with income tax.  Here, the change in net 
earnings excluding pension accrual is ȟ ௧ܰ௘௘, defined as:  ȟ ௧ܰ௘௘ ൌ ܩ௧ െ ܰܫܥ௧௘௘ െ ܫ ௧ܶ௘௘ܩ௧ିଵ െ ܰܫܥ௧ିଵ௘௘ െ ܫ ௧ܶିଵ௘௘ െ  ? 
(12) 
where ܰܫܥ௧௘௘represents employee NICs, and ܫ ௧ܶ௘௘the income tax payable in year ݐ.  The change in 
net earnings including the cost of pension accrual from the employee ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁŝƐȟ ௫ܶǡ௧௘௘, 
defined as:  ȟ ௫ܶǡ௧௘௘ ൌ ܩ௧ െ ܰܫܥ௧௘௘ െ ܫ ௧ܶ௘௘ ൅ ൫ܩ௧ൈܥ௫ǡ௧൯ܩ௧ିଵ െ ܰܫܥ௧ିଵ௘௘ െ ܫ ௧ܶିଵ௘௘ ൅ ൫ܩ௧ିଵൈܥ௫ǡ௧ିଵ൯ െ  ? 
(13) 
For both employee and employer NICS, I assume that there is no contracting-out of the State 
Earnings Related Pension Scheme of State Second Pension. 
5. Results 
5.1. Total cost of accrual 
First, I look at the change in the cost of pension accrual.  As discussed in section 3.1, I consider the 
12-month period starting 31 March 1995 to the twelve-month period starting 31 March 2015, but 
also look at the cost of accrual calculated on the 31 March 2015 basis, using bond yields and 
expected inflation as at 31 March 2016 and 30 September 2016.  These results are given in Figure 2 
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for a 40 year-old male with a retirement age of 65, assuming a discount rate of UK government 
bonds plus 1% per annum, both as a member of a final salary scheme and a CARE arrangement. 
Figure 2  ? Accrual rate for a 40 year-old male pension scheme member 
 
Source: Bank of England, Office for National Statistics, ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
This shows that in March 1995, the cost of accrual for a member of a final salary scheme was only 
6.8% of earnings, dropping slightly the following year to 5.9% of earnings.  The cost of accrual then 
grew steadily to the period commencing 31 March 2000, peaking at 18.5%.  It then fell back slightly, 
before rising steadily up until 24.9% for the period commencing 31 March 2006.  March 2009 saw a 
sharp drop back to 16.1%.  The cost of accrual then rose gradually until March 2013, reaching 21.3%.  
There was a small one-year drop, but after that the cost rose significantly in March 2015 to 25.0% of 
earnings, and again in September 2016 to 36.1% of earnings.  Interestingly, whilst conditional 
indexation would cut the cost of accrual significantly, it would still leave it at its highest ever level  W 
27.0% of earnings for the period commencing 30 September 2016. 
It is interesting to contrast the change in cost for a final salary member with that of a CARE 
beneficiary.  Whilst the broad patterns are similar, the initial cost of a CARE pension is far lower, at 
4.2% of salary.  Up until 2008, real earnings growth means that the cost of final salary provision 
accelerates away from the cost of a CARE pension, as this growth is used to project future changes 
to real earnings.  However, after this period, the impact of lower and ultimately negative real 
earnings growth sees the cost of a CARE pension actually overtaking that of a final salary pension by 
a small margin. 
In fact, if we concentrate on the ten years from 2005 to 2015  W the decade following the analysis in 
Sweeting (2008), we can see that after an increase in the period from 2005 to 2006, the cost of 
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Impact of Conditional Indexation
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*Calculated using March 2015 longevity data, but interest 
rate and expected inflation data as at given date
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contrasts with the change in the cost of accrual for a CARE scheme (from 15.6% in 2006 to 25.4% in 
2015) 
It should be clear that the assumption for real earnings growth is key here.  In fact, for the period 
2006 to 2015, the fall in the real earnings growth assumption negates the impact of all of the factors 
causing the rise apparent in the cost of CARE accrual.  If a higher figure is used than that suggested 
here  W essentially no real earnings growth from 2014 onwards, then the cost of providing a final 
salary pension will inevitably be greater. 
For the remaining analysis, I look only at the cost of final salary accrual. 
5.2. Components of accrual cost 
The three components of the change in the cost of accrual  W benefits, longevity and interest rates 
(including projected price inflation and earnings growth)  W are described above, as is their 
calculation.  Because the sum of each of the three components leaves a rounding error, I allocate the 
error to each of the three components in proportion to the size of each component.  The results are 
shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3  ? Components of the change in the accrual rate for a 40 year-old male pension scheme member 
 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ ?ĂŶŬŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?KĨĨŝĐĞĨŽƌEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
Longevity increases have been a reasonably constant source of increasing pension costs.  Some years 
have been worse than others: 2006 saw longevity contributing a 0.6% of earnings increase in the 
cost of accrual, whilst the average was only 0.3% per annum.  The same average applies to the ten 
years from 2005 to 2015, the decade following the analysis of Sweeting (2008).  This variation largely 
reflects unexpected increases, rather than the variation arising from a population whose longevity is 
expected to improve.  Overall, though, this 0.3% increase is small compared to the 0.9% increase 
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The impact of the change in benefits has been, on average, small: it accounts for an increase in the 
cost of accrual of 2.2% of earnings from 1996 to 1997, when 5% LPI was introduced, and then a drop 
of 0.1% of earnings when 5% LPI was replaced by 2.5% LPI in 2005.  The drop here was small because 
expected RPI inflation was not significantly higher than 2.5%.  This also means that the impact of 
benefit changes for a final salary scheme after 2005 is nil.  Interestingly, if this analysis is repeated 
for a CARE scheme, there is an additional, larger fall in 2011  W equivalent to 2.3% of the cost of 
accrual  W when RPI is replaced with CPI.  This is because for a CARE scheme, increases both before 
and after retirement are affected, and the impact on pre-retirement increases is significant; 
however, by the time of this change, implied inflation on both an RPI and a CPI basis was greater 
than 2.5% at all terms, so the change in inflation definition had no impact on the projected value of 
post-retirement component of benefits. 
The suggested move to conditional indexation for pensions in payment would cause a much bigger 
drop in the cost of accrual: 9.6% of earnings.  This assumes that conditional indexation would mean 
that there would be no guaranteed increases in benefits in payment.  The change in cost is so high 
compared to the introduction of 5% LPI because long-term interest rates are so low now compared 
with 20 years ago.  Figure 4, which shows the 20-year spot rate for nominal UK government bonds 
and for implied RPI inflation, demonstrates this clearly.  This means that the present value of a 
change in future increases is correspondingly higher. 
Figure 4  ? 20-year government bond yield and implied RPI inflation rate 
 
Source: Bank of England 
Figure 4 also helps to explain the change in the cost of accrual due to nominal government bond 
yields and implied inflation, which together with assumed earnings increases I refer to as interest 
rates.  Both bond yields and implied inflation fell sharply from 1996 to 1999, with nominal rates 
falling more than implied inflation.  This did lead to some noticeable increases in the cost of accrual, 
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because the 20-year bond yield in 1999 was still relatively high  W at least when compared with the 
current yield  W the impact was not catastrophic. 
The combination of a rise in bond yields and a fall in implied inflation in 2001 led to a fall in the cost 
of accrual attributable to interest rates of 2.6% of earnings.  Changes were smaller for a few years 
until interest rates contributed to a rise in the cost of accrual of 3.5% of earnings in 2004 and 4..5% 
of earnings in 2006  W this time, a fall in bond yields coincided with a rise in implied inflation.  The 
next big change was in 2009.  Although bond yields fell, implied inflation fell further, leading to a fall 
in the cost of accrual of 8.8% of earnings.  A period of increased volatility followed.  However, the 
next significant change happened in 2015, when falling bond yields added 7.0% of earnings to the 
cost of accrual, but even this was dwarfed by the fall in yields following the Brexit referendum: 
between March and September 2016, the fall in government bond yields added a further 10.9% of 
earnings to the cost of accrual on an annualised basis. 
The average change in the cost of accrual due to interest rates for a final salary scheme member was 
0.5% of earnings per annum for the period 1995 to 2015.  This contrasts with an average of 0.9% of 
earnings for a CARE scheme.  When considering the period 2005 to 2015, the difference is even 
more stark: 0.2% per annum for final salary versus 1.3% for CARE, with only the 2005 to 2006 
observation keeping the final salary figure positive.  This difference is purely down to the drop in 
projected real salary inflation.  In other words, if it were not for this drop in real salary inflation, the 
change in interest rates would have had a far greater effect in the period 2005 to 2015 than in 1995 
to 2005.  
5.3. The cost of defined benefit pensions to employers 
Having analysed not only the changes in the cost of accrual but also the drivers of these changes, I 
can now consider the impact of this cost on remuneration.  First, however, it is worth looking at how 
remuneration has changed before allowing for pensions.  If we concentrate on private sector 
earnings, we can easily see the impact of adding National Insurance contributions to employer costs, 
as indicated in Figure 5.  This shows the growth in earnings cost for individual earning 1, 2, 4 and 8 
times average earnings.  The differences arise because of the differences in NIC rates and bands.  It is 





Figure 5  ? Average annual growth in net and gross cost of earnings, private sector including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, 
1996-2016 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
ĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ/ŶĚĞǆďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚŝƐ ? ?,DZ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
Focussing on the net earnings at the average level, I then consider the difference between the cost 
of employing an individual in a defined contribution scheme and a defined benefit scheme.  
According to the Office for National Statistics (2015), members contribute on average 5% of earnings 
to private sector defined benefit pension schemes.  The Office for National Statistics (2003) also 
indicate that employee contributions to contributory defined benefit schemes have been at or 
around this level since at least 2000.  This amount must therefore be deducted from the cost of 
accrual, as it is a cost borne by the employee rather than the employer. 
Until 2014, employer contributions to defined contribution schemes had also remained relatively 
stable, at around 6% of earnings.  As outlined in section 1.3, employer contribution rates dropped 
considerably at this point, following the introduction of auto-enrolment.  Since this drop in the 
average contribution rate is due to the addition of a heterogeneous population, and because the 
analysis is intended to be about the cost of defined benefit accrual rather than defined contribution 
provision, I assume a constant employer contribution of 6% of earnings for members of defined 
contribution schemes.  In Figure 5, I therefore show three series for a 40 year-old individual on 
average earnings: the total cost of employment excluding pensions; the total cost of employment 
including a 6% contribution to a defined contribution scheme; and the total cost of employment 
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Figure 6  ? Average annual growth in cost of average earnings, private sector including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, 
allowing for pensions, 1996-2016 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
ĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ/ŶĚĞǆďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚŝƐ ? ?,DZ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
There are two key features in Figure 6.  First, the cost of employing a worker and providing a defined 
benefit pension has grown consistently more quickly than the cost of employing someone in a 
defined contribution scheme.  To be precise, the average increase for a defined benefit employee 
was 4.7% per annum over the last twenty years, compared with 3.7% per annum for a defined 
contribution employee  W a difference of 1.0% per annum.  Most of this difference occurred over the 
period 1995 to 2005  W the average increase from 2005 to 2015 was only 0.5% per annum.  However, 
it is also interesting to note that until 1999-2000, it was actually more expensive to have an 
employee in a defined contribution scheme than to provide membership of a defined benefit 
scheme. 
5.4. The value of defined benefit pensions to employees 
Moving onto the value of defined benefit pensions for employees, I first look at earnings net of 
employee NICs and income tax.  It is clear from Figure 7 that there has been a significant move to 
increase redistribution, with net pay for the least well paid increasing relative to gross earnings, and 
the opposite happening for the most well-off.  Clearly, there is no guarantee that the net income for 
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Figure 7  ? Average annual growth in net and gross value of private sector earnings, including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, 
1996-2016 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
ĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ/ŶĚĞǆďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚŝƐ ? ?,DZ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
When looking at the value of accrual in Figure 8, I again concentrate on a 40 year-old individual on 
average earnings with a retirement age of 65.  The result, unsurprisingly, has a similar profile to 
employer costs.  The results are similar numerically as well  W the average increase in earnings for a 
defined benefit employee was 4.8% per annum over the last twenty years, compared with 3.8% per 
annum for a defined contribution employee  W again, a difference of 1.0% per annum.  This too falls 
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Figure 8  ? Average annual growth in the value of average private sector earnings, including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, 
allowing for pensions, 1996-2016 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
ĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ/ŶĚĞǆďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚŝƐ ? ?,DZ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
6. Conclusion 
The cost of employing a member of a final salary defined benefit pension scheme has outpaced the 
cost of employing someone in a defined contribution arrangement over the last twenty years.  From 
1996 to 2016, the difference in the total cost has been some 1.0% of earnings per annum.  When 
ůŽŽŬŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĨƌŽŵĂŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨĂĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ
benefit scheme relative to a defined contribution arrangement is the same  W around 1.0% of 
earnings per annum.  This means that allowing for an employee contribution of 5% of earnings, the 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?Ɛcost of accrual grew from 1.8% of earnings in March 1995 (when the total cost was only 
6.8% of earnings) to 20.0% of earnings in March 2015.  As such, having employees who are still 
accruing defined benefit pensions has resulted in a growing financial burden for firms in this 
position.  Much of the increase in cost and value took place over the period 1995 to 2005, with the 
average increase being only 0.5% higher for the period 2005 to 2015.   
The average impact of interest rate changes on the change in the cost of accrual is 0.5% per annum.  
This is significantly more than the average impact of longevity improvements, which is 0.3% per 
annum.  Both of these have added to the total cost, as has have changes to benefits, by around 0.1% 
per annum on average.  The impact of interest rate changes has been moderated by the fall in real 
earnings.  This can be seen by considering the impact of interest rate changes on the cost of accrual 
in a CARE scheme, which itself exceeded 0.9% per annum on average.  The change from RPI to CPI 
also had an impact on CARE schemes by reducing the cost of accrual by 2.3%, wiping out the 










































Gross earnings less income tax and employee NICs
Gross earnings less income tax and employee NICs, plus DC pension cost
Gross earnings less income tax and employee NICs, plus DB pension cost
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Looking only at changes in interest rates, the change in cost from March 2015 to March 2016 was 
small, with the estimated cost of accrual to the employer rising only slightly, to 20.2%.  However, 
following the Brexit vote and the subsequent reintroduction of quantitative easing, the estimated 
cost of accrual has risen to 31.1% as at September 2016. 
If the current 2.5% LPI increases to pensions in payment were removed and replaced with 
conditional indexation, the cost of accrual for the employer would fall back to 22.0%. 
The total cost of defined benefit accrual  W including employee contributions  W is therefore 36.1% of 
earnings as at September 2016, a number that would fall to 27.0% of earnings 2.5% LPI increases 
were removed.  Contrast this with current payments to defined contribution schemes, which in 2015 
stood at 4.0% of earnings, of which employers contributed 2.5%.  It is likely that these figures are 
depressed by the large number of newly-auto-enrolled members.  But even before auto-enrolment, 
the total contribution rate to defined contribution schemes was only 8.5%, with employers paying 
6.0%.  This is marginally above the maximum auto-enrolment level that will be reached in April 2019, 
of 8% of earnings, with employers paying at least 3%  W less than a third of the amount needed to 
match even a non-increasing defined benefit pension. 
If we remain in a low growth, low interest rate environment, contributions to defined contribution 
schemes will need to rise sharply.  If they do not, individuals relying on these schemes will reach 
retirement with inadequate assets and very uncertain futures  W and the only group able to support 
them will be taxpayers. 
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